It is clear from this saying that a fictitious transaction may be intended by the parties to create certain legal rights, but it is nevertheless a deception because there is a difference between what they appear to create and what they actually create. Mr. Charles and Mr. Agrawal developed a plan to cancel the bankruptcy, which included the sale of the two properties to companies owned and controlled by Mr. Agrawal and controlled by Mr. Agrawal (V1 and V2 respectively). The District Court judge found that Mr. Agrawal knew that the co-owners had not accepted the sale and that their signatures on the transfer documents, including the TR1s, were forged. All these documents assumed that all the legal and economic interests of the land had been transferred to V1 and V2 respectively. The agreement between Mr. Charles and Mr. Agrawal was a mortgage fraud.
A necessary part of the arrangement was that the equity of the co-owners had apparently been transferred. Both properties were then billed to banks (banks). “. These are acts or documents made or performed by the parties to the “appearance”, which are intended by them to give the impression to third parties or the court that they are creating rights and obligations between the parties that are different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) that the parties intend to create. But one thing, I think, is clear in the principle of law, in morality and in authority. For actions or documents to constitute “deception”, regardless of the legal consequences, all parties must have a common intention that the acts or documents do not create the legal rights and obligations they appear to create. (Emphasis added.) The error in Ahmed is highlighted in Morgan J.`s judgment, in which he effectively applied the blue pencil test to TR1 and treated all express references to co-owners as removed from the document in order to have some effect. Only in this way could the Court ignore the fact that the TR1 was invalid for the transfer of ownership (which is the express purpose of the TR1) and could conclude (a) that there remained a “transfer” within the meaning of section 63 because Mr. Charles was the sole owner for that purpose and therefore intended to do so, and (b) it was not a deception, with respect only to its beneficiaries. Article 63 does not require the creation of a legal fiction to protect infringement against invalidity. However, this happens in these cases.
First, the action must be objectively unfounded in the sense that no reasonable party to the proceedings could reasonably expect to succeed on the merits. If an objective litigant could conclude that the action is reasonably calculated to produce a favorable outcome, the action will be immune under Noerr and an antitrust action based on the false exception will fail. PRE, 113 S.Ct to 1928, 26 USPQ to 1646 (note omitted). “. These are acts or documents performed or performed by the parties to the `appearance` that they intend to give the impression to third parties or to the court that they create between the parties rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) that the parties intend to create” (emphasis added). As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has prohibited us from equating losses on the merits with an objective and unreasonable decision. The court requires a review of the appropriateness of the defendant`s dispute when it is filed. “[T]he moot court must be the continuation of claims that are so unfounded that no reasonable party to the proceeding could reasonably expect to receive favourable remedies.” PRE, 113 S.Ct. um 1929. Conversely, “the existence of probable grounds for initiating legal proceedings precludes a finding that a defendant affected by an agreement has engaged in fictitious litigation.” The Supreme Court recently presented a two-stage definition of show trials.2 minutes spent reading These false pleadings are generally discouraged and, in some cases, treated as void.
The banks argued that, consistent with Ahmed v. Kendrick, section 63 of the 1925 AHR Act had the effect that the economic interest of Mr. Charles had been transferred to V1/V2 anyway and therefore, although the statutory royalties were inefficient, the banks each had a reasonable charge of more than half of V1/V2`s share. The co-owners argued that section 63 was not applicable because the TR1s were not “transfers” and were in any event misleading and therefore void for all purposes. There is no proper basis for adding to the definition of forgery the requirement that S1 and B1 intend that the document has no legal effect. Such an addition is in direct contradiction to the dictate of Snook, which expressly admits that there may be an intended legal effect of the document, which is why Chief Justice Diplock says in the passage from Snook quoted above: It was not disputed that TR1 was not effective with respect to the two parcels of land to transfer title because, in any case, one of the co-owners had not signed it: His signature was forged. The question was what happened to the economic interest. The falsification of S2`s signature by S1, which is intended by both S1 and B1 in order to trick a lender into lending by believing that B1 is the rightful and beneficial owner of a property, is a clear example of a document intended by S1 and B1 to create rights/interests, which cannot do so.
As such, it calls for recognition as a hoax. In Penn v. Bristol and West Building Society  2 FLR 93 held that a fraudulent TR1 constituted deception in (approximately) the same circumstances as in Victus Estates. The judge had wrongly added the requirement that there was an intention not to establish statutory rights and, in the absence of a finding to that effect by the district judge, there could be no deception. That is not the law. Such a requirement creates considerable practical difficulties for innocent litigants and the courts. In general, scammers (like Mr. Charles in these cases or Mr. Wilson in Penn) do not provide evidence or leave a report on their fraudulent thinking and strategy.
Was the learned judge right when he said that a transfer signed in such circumstances is not a deception? We respectfully note that the judge`s analysis and the Court of Appeal`s refusal to reconsider that analysis were erroneous. The authors argue that: In Victus Estates and Others v. Munroe and Others  EWHC 2411(Ch), the Court took into account the situation where one co-owner (S1) forges the signature of the other (S2) when transferring his ownership to B1 if B1 is aware of the forgery. The court concluded that such a transfer did not constitute deception and was nevertheless effective in transferring S1`s fair interest in the property to B1 under section 63 of the Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925). In this case, B1 (one of the fraudsters) claimed to charge the property to a mortgage lender. The court concluded that this was effective in calculating the interest to which B1 was entitled, namely half of its share of the property. This is relevant when it comes to the correct application of Article 63 (1). Article 63(1) enters into force in order to convey what the `assigning parties` have expressed both the intention to transfer and the power to transfer.
If the seller in a TR1 S1 and S2 is together the roommate of the legal title to the property in question, but S1 falsifies the signature of S2, if § 63 (1) is correctly interpreted, “the transferring party” cannot be treated as S1 alone on the side of the transferor, ignoring S2, who is one and one of the roommates. S1 and S2 hold the legal title together, each can only exchange with the other. Similarly, S1 alone is not an intermediate part: this is clear on the front of the promotion. The transferor is not S1, but S1 and S2 act together. Without the entire transferor, no transfer can take place. According to Penn, the district court judge concluded, among other things, that the economic interests did not exist because the transfers were deceptive packages. The judge also agreed that a TR1 should not be recognized as a transfer if the parties involved knew that its alleged transfer of ownership was fraud. On the one hand, the Supreme Court warned that “if the antitrust defendant has lost the underlying litigation, a court must resist the understandable temptation to argue a posteriori by concluding that an ultimately unsuccessful action must have been inappropriate or without merit.” On the other hand, provisional success on the merits does not necessarily preclude a court from concluding that the dispute was unfounded. See Boulware, 960 F.2d, pp. 788-89. In Snook v. London and West Riding Investments Ltd  2 QB 786, Diplock LJ, at para.
802D, explains the meaning of deception as follows: Thus, the definition of deception in Snook is satisfied. The fact that TR1 can have some legal effect and be effective in transferring part of the economic interest in the absence of a common intention to deceive does not change the situation. A fictitious document is void for any purpose whatsoever (see paragraph 17 of 1st Property Finance Ltd v Martin & Haigh (a firm)  5 WLUK 17). Since the facts are not in dispute, whether a remedy is reasonable or constitutes an abuse of process is a question of law. See PRE, 113 p.Ct. circa 1930 (“If, as in this case, there is no dispute as to the fundamental facts of the underlying legal proceeding, a court may decide as of right on a probable reason.”) (Citations omitted).